| Files of Interest |
[Dec. 11th, 2009|16:06] |
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FM Transmission and Reception by Rider and Uslan. A 1950 text on Frequency Modulation RF systems. Admittedly older than most who will download it, but the theory remains the same regardless.
Radio System Fundamentals and Point-to-Point Digital Microwave Radio Systems - A somewhat older text from the USDA Rural Electrification Administration. Still useful to print out and keep in the reference library.
AIR FORCE MANUAL 33-274 ON-HOOK TELEPHONE SECURITY GUIDELINES - An excellent text on securing telephone systems against eavesdropping, complements of the US Air Force.
FM 34-60 Counterintelligence - This is one of the more useful military manuals that should be in your library.
FM 34-3 Intelligence Analysis - Another very useful military manual.
Who's Listening, by Ian "Captain Zap" Murphy. I met Zap during the mid 1980s. He's a very interesting fellow, and was years ahead of his time when it came to electronic fun 'n games. This paper was as close as you could get to DIY without being blatantly so. I remember him talking about converting microwave oven magnetrons into microwave TV transmitters just before 73 Magazine came out with an article detailing how to do exactly that. Ian wrote this paper back in 1987, and a lot of it is still applicable today.
This little gem originally appeared in Cybertech under the title "On Playing the Game", by 1LT Charlie Holmes. Can you guess who originally wrote it? A very good piece that many people just don't get.
Memetic Engineering, Modern Political Warfare, and Terrorism in a New World appeared in Cybertech during the mid 1990s. Another example of stuff that was way ahead of its time.
The late Bill Cheek's Scanner Data Decoder FAQ - This is one of those handy references for those of you who want to decode various forms of digital radio signals. Another one of those handy old-school text files.
In 1990, British scanner hobbyist Nigel Ballard wrote an awesome series of textfiles that was considered required reading. While some of the more specific information in the series is now outdated, there are a few that still bear reading.
A Journey Through My Scanning Triumphs And Disasters
RECEIVER HUNTING USING THE 'I.F.' PRINCIPLE
A LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
ADVANCED SIGNAL ACQUISITION FOR PRIVATE SCANNER OPERATORS
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| (no subject) |
[Dec. 10th, 2009|17:43] |
It's definitely cold out there.
After like six months of nothing, there's finally another meeting for the fledgling cleveland hackerspace. It's at 8pm at the Lakewood Panera.
I'm debating going, because I don't think it'll amount to much, and I don't want to waste my time. After so much time with absolutely nothing happening, I kindof want to see some momentum before I get too excited.
After the meeting was announced, there was a flood of chatter on the mail list, which amounted to debating the location for the meeting, and it seemed to change several times before finally reverting back to what it originally was. That, plus the weather, pretty much leads me to guess that probably like 3 people will actually show up. Which, if I want to be optimistic, is three better than none, but I guess I'm not feeling optimistic. |
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| o.O |
[Dec. 10th, 2009|11:30] |
We use a debit card *as* a credit card if need be now, because in a fit of sticking it to the man I canceled all actual credit cards after they raised my rate for no reason earlier this year. I have a couple hundred in cash on hand, and checks, and gold and silver obviously, plus a useless (in this situation) 0% wal-mart card ... but no debit card or credit card.
Why is this a problem?
We lost our debit card on Monday (I lost it). So the bank sent another one and it should be here Saturday.
Because we use a lot of water between the animals, gardens, and whatever our bill is high to begin with. I drained the pool for repairs, and refilled it a few weeks ago, so it was extra high this month. My wife forgot to pay the water bill, and I was 7 dollars short of the $220 bill when the guy knocked, so he turned it off. So, here are the options:
Wait until Saturday and pay it.
Sell some silver at a pawn shop and pay it.
Now, to expand on the problem. We went to one vehicle, and since I am pretty self-reliant around here we decided to go to one vehicle. My wife just took that vehicle yesterday on a business trip to the west coast of FL until the 15th. No way am I riding a bicycle to town to pawn $20 in silver and stay cash broke for a week over water I have stored.
Anyone else would be screwed I suppose. Lucky for me, I have a couple hundred gallons of water in the garage, and a pool full of flushing water, and rainwater than goes on the plants usually (growing season is all but over), even though bone dry right now, a frontal boundary is coming through and they will be full by the end of the day.
Screw it, I'm going old school until Saturday. Especially because the wife isn't here to bitch about it, and I outrank the kid. No water this week, unless I hand haul it.
Prepare for the unexpected I suppose. Shit happens even when you have plenty of money in the bank. The county doesn't take checks, heh.
EDIT: Nevermind. You can pay it online. I didn't think of that at first. I called and they told me about it. I should be able to do that now. |
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| Security theater, continued: |
[Dec. 10th, 2009|05:07] |
The Transportation Security Administration Tuesday said it is launching a "full review" of an incident in which the agency posted on the Internet a sensitive manual outlining screening procedures for law enforcement officers, diplomats, prisoners, federal air marshals and others. The manual lists the 12 passports that gets you moved directly to secondary screening, procedures for domestic dissidents and activists, and the calibration and sensitivity technicals on the metal detectors.
Link to download the unredacted manual from wikileaks:
http://88.80.16.63/leak/tsa-screening-procedures-2008.pdf
Oh yeah, page 58 has the current CIA credential sample and template too. The feds were quick to say the badge is and I quote: "outdated, unclassified, and unimplemented".
LOL. Sure buddy. |
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| third post. |
[Dec. 9th, 2009|21:14] |
| [ | mood |
| |  thirsty | ] |
| [ | music |
| | Nightmare Before Christmas | ] |
Photographer: samonthetv
Number of Photos: just one, today.
Theme: 42. Sweet
( Right this way, please. ) |
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| More Air Defense Woes for Iran |
[Dec. 9th, 2009|18:04] |
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http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2009/12/more-air-defense-woes-for-iran.html When Tehran conducted a highly-publicized air defense exercise last month, we expressed doubts about the hardware on display--and its potential effectiveness against an Israeli attack.
In fact, video footage of the drill (which aired on state-run TV) appeared to be recycled from previous exercises. Air defense systems highlighted in press reports were the same antiquated surface-to-air missiles (I-HAWK, SA-5) and anti-aircraft artillery pieces (40 mm) that have defended Iranian installations for decades. There was no mention of the modern, short-range SA-15 missile system--acquired from Russia just three years ago--or the state-of-the-art S-300, which Tehran has reportedly purchased, but Moscow hasn't delivered.
In other words, the capabilities demonstrated by the Iranians hardly matched their rhetoric. That's hardly a surprise; there has long been a significant gap between Tehran's military claims and what it can actually deliver. But Iranian officials have cranked up their propaganda over the past couple of years, declaring their air defenses could repulse any Israeli (or U.S.) air strike.
Turns out, our suspicions about last month's exercise were well-founded. Strategy Page reports that Iranian generals in charge of the drill were "surprised" at how "uncoordinated" and "ill-prepared" their forces were for such an attack.
The air defense evaluation revealed a litany of serious problems, including poor communications and weaponry that failed to perform. From an intelligence standpoint, those findings are hardly surprising. Western analysts have long described Iran's air defense system as the military equivalent of a Chinese fire drill (with apologies to the Chinese). Despite investments in more modern equipment since the early 1990s, Tehran's air defense network remains a hodge-podge of antiquated systems and newer hardware, linked with a command-and-control network that is suspect, at best.
Advanced air defense systems rely on sophisticated radars and other sensors, relaying information to automated C3 nodes that can process (and analyze) literally hundreds of tracks at once, and assist commanders in assigning valid targets to missile batteries, AAA sites and interceptor aircraft.
Iran has been trying to make that transition for years, but it's been an uphill struggle. At last report, Tehran's air defense network was only partially automated, with a Chinese-built, automated C3 system functioning alongside the existing model, built on manual reporting and tracking.
Making matters worse, Iran's radar coverage is poor, with significant gaps below 15,000 feet. To compensate for that problem, Tehran built hundreds of visual observation (VIZOB) posts along its borders, manned by members of the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the "regular" military, local militias and even the police. The spotters often report anything they see or hear, so Iranian air defense C3 nodes are often saturated with sightings of bright lights, mysterious sounds, and unidentified aircraft.
And, because commanders (typically) lack effective decision aids, air defense systems are sometimes assigned to engage phantom targets, or--even worse--civilian aircraft. A few years ago, the Iranians came dangerously close to shooting down a Saudi jetliner, bound for Tehran. Apparently, the Saudi flight crew had changed their flight plan (and coordinated it with Iranian air traffic controllers), but the revision was never passed to air defense officials.
To be fair, confusion and the need for split-second decisions can affect the most sophisticated air defense systems, as evidenced by the destruction of an Iranian passenger jet by the USS Vincennes in 1988. But, to borrow a German general's description of the U.S. Army in World War II, Iran's air defense system practices chaos on a daily basis, and the potential for error remains especially high. Factor in the intensity of an exercise--and fears of an impending Israeli attack--and it's little wonder that the Iranians performed poorly during that recent drill.
As Strategy Page observes, Iran's most effective weapon is bluster. But even that tool has its limitations. While it works with the media and the general public, military analysts know better. Tehran's air defense network is anything but effective and that may be one reason the generals described its failure in such blunt terms. They know that Iranian politicians won't tone down their comments about "advanced" military capabilities, but they can do something more useful--like pressuring Moscow to deliver the S-300.
The availability of that system would greatly bolster Iran's air defense capabilities, and force Israel to alter its attack plans. Without the S-300, Tehran must rely on antiquated weapons and command systems to protect its nuclear sites from attack. Such marginal capabilities won't keep the Israelis up at night, but from an Iranian perspective, they are a cause for concern. |
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| (no subject) |
[Dec. 9th, 2009|17:47] |
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Winds have really picked up since I started driving home from work. I'm super glad I have a garage I can park in. I expect it'll probably look like winter tomorrow, finally. |
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| Your Government at Work |
[Dec. 9th, 2009|12:30] |
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http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2009/12/your-government-at-work.html While the Transportation Security Administration has been tight-lipped about what transpired on AirTran Flight 297, the agency has been a little too open about some of its most sensitive screening procedures.
According to Brian Ross of ABC News, the TSA posted on-line its airport screening manual, including special rules for diplomats, CIA officers and law enforcement officials.
Call it an early Christmas present for Al Qaida--and anyone else interested in circumventing TSA security measures:
The most sensitive parts of the 93-page Standard Operating Procedures manual were apparently redacted in a way that computer savvy individuals easily overcame.
The document shows sample CIA, Congressional and law enforcement credentials which experts say would make it easy for terrorists to duplicate.
The improperly redacted areas indicate that only 20 percent of checked bags are to be hand searched for explosives and reveal in detail the limitations of x-ray screening machines.
Mississippi Congressman Bennie Thompson, who chairs the House Homeland Security Committee, blames part on the problem on a lack of leadership at TSA. The agency has been without an administrator for most of the year.
But that's a rather lame--and convenient--excuse. With minor exceptions, you don't need an agency director to decide what will (and won't be posted) on an organization's website. And, fostering a climate that promotes information security is a job for all agency employees, not just the administrator.
Sad to say, but it's highly unlikely that any TSA administrator could have prevented the "inadvertent" posting of that security manual. Such mistakes are a reflection of the organization and its culture. Changing that should be Job #1 for whoever winds up running the agency.
***
ADDENDUM: Readers will note that neither ABC News (nor Congressman Thompson) offered a satisfactory answer to a salient question: namely why hasn't the Obama Administration appointed someone to take charge of TSA? Instead of filling up the West Wing with all of those "czars,"--or spending months on his health care scheme--the President might devote a little time to filling a key agency appointment.
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| hahaha |
[Dec. 9th, 2009|10:48] |
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jersey fucking shore |
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